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Abstract
In this paper, we show that contingency
connectives, which mark causal and con-
ditional relations (PDTBGroup, 2008), re-
strict the possible interpretations of reports
in their scope in a way that many other
connectives, such as contrastive connec-
tives, do not. We argue that this result
has immediate implications for the seman-
tics of causal relations and for the anno-
tation of implicit connectives. In particu-
lar, it shows that the assumption, implicit
in some work on NLP, that the semantics
of explicit connectives can be translated to
implicit connectives is not anodyne.
1 Introduction
In addition to their standard intensional use, many
embedding verbs have a semantically parentheti-
cal use (Urmson, 1952; Simons, 2007), in which
the content of the embedded clause conveys the
main point of the report. Semantically parentheti-
cal uses can occur even when the report is not syn-
tactically parenthetical, as shown in (1) and (2). In
these examples, the embedded clause he is out of
town (labeled ‘β’) conveys the main point because
its content offers an explanation of Fred’s absence.
(1) - [Why didn’t Fred come to my party?]α
- Jane said [he is out of town.]β
(2) [Fred didn’t come to my party.]α Jane said
[he is out of town.]β
If the matrix clause does not contribute directly
to the explanation of Fred’s absence in (1) and
(2), it is arguable that only the content of the β-
clauses contributes to the second argument of the
explanatory relations that hold in these examples.
In terms of Segmented Discourse Representation
Theory (SDRT) (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), for
example, the relation QUESTION-ANSWER-PAIR
in (1) should be taken to hold only between α and
β; the content of the matrix clause should be like-
wise excluded from the second argument of EX-
PLANATION in (2) (Hunter et al., 2006). Similarly,
the Penn Discourse Treebank (PDTB) would relate
only α and β in (2) with implicit because (Dinesh
et al., 2005; Prasad et al., 2006).
Given this analysis of (1) and (2), however, it
is puzzling why the report in (3) cannot be under-
stood parenthetically. On the surface, (2) and (3)
differ only in that the two sentences in (2) have
been connected with the subordinating conjunc-
tion because in (3). Yet this seemingly harmless
change leads to a dramatic change in interpretive
possibilities.
(3) (#)1 Fred didn’t come to my party because
Jane said he is out of town.
And as we’ll see in §2, the contrast between (2)
and (3), heretofore unnoticed in the literature, can
be replicated for all contingency relations: all con-
tingency connectives exhibit a distaste for seman-
tically parenthetical reports.
The contrast between (2) and (3) is surprising
for a further reason, namely that many relations
and connectives that do not indicate causality do
appear to accept the embedded clauses of seman-
tically parenthetical reports as arguments.
(4) Lots of people are coming to my party. Jane
said (for example) that Fred is coming with
his whole family.
(5) Fred is coming to my party, although Jane
told me that Bill is not.
The report in (4) is understood parenthetically; it
is the content of the embedded clause, not the ma-
trix clause, that serves as a specific example of the
1We use the symbol ‘(#)’ to mark examples containing re-
ports that cannot be interpreted parenthetically; ‘(#)’ does not
exclude the possibility of a non-parenthetical interpretation.
claim made in the first sentence. Unlike in (3),
this parenthetical reading is felicitous even when
for example is explicit. (5) shows that semanti-
cally parenthetical reports can occur in contrastive
relations, as the contrast intuitively holds between
Fred’s coming to the party and Bill’s not coming.
It also shows, given that although is a subordinat-
ing conjunction, that a parenthetical reading of (3)
is not blocked simply by the fact that because is a
subordinating conjunction.
The contrast between (2) and (3), as well as that
between (3) and (4)/(5), has direct implications for
the annotation of reports and the semantics of con-
tingency relations. In §2, we argue for the follow-
ing generalization:
(C) if a contingency relation is marked by an ex-
plicit connective that has syntactic scope over
the matrix clause of a report, this report can-
not have a parenthetical interpretation.
With general support for (C) in place, §3 returns
to the contrast, illustrated by (2) and (3), between
examples of EXPLANATION with implicit and ex-
plicit connectives. We argue that this contrast
raises problems for existing discourse theories and
annotation practices. §4 discusses causal connec-
tives that have a temporal sense, e.g. after, which
appear to be counterexamples to (C). We show that
this problem is only superficial.
In what follows, we will use the term par-
enthetical to talk only about semantically paren-
thetical uses, unless otherwise stated. We will
also adopt the notation conventions of the PDTB
(PDTB Group, 2008). Each discourse connec-
tive has two arguments, Arg1 and Arg2. The text
whose interpretation is the basis for Arg1 appears
in italics, while the text that serves as the basis for
Arg2 appears in bold. If the connective is explicit,
it is underlined. An example is given in (6):
(6) Fred didn’t come to the party because he is
out of town.
Sections 2 and 3, like the current section, will
focus exclusively on data in English, though the
claims made about the data in these sections hold
for the French translations of the data as well. In
section 4, we will discuss a point on which the
data in English and French diverge in an interest-
ing way. In all cases, the examples that we use to
motivate our analysis are constructed for the sake
of simplicity. Nevertheless, our claims for English
are supported by data from the PDTB and The New
York Times, as we discuss in more detail in §5.
2 Contingency relations
In the PDTB, the class of contingency relations
includes causal relations (EXPLANATION and RE-
SULT in SDRT) and their pragmatic counterparts
(EXPLANATION* and RESULT*), as well as se-
mantic and pragmatic conditional relations. To
this we add relations of purpose or GOAL, marked
by connectives such as so that and in order to. For
simplicity, we will adopt the vocabulary of SDRT
when talking about discourse relations, e.g. us-
ing EXPLANATION when the PDTB would talk of
‘reason’, etc.
In section 2.1, we argue that EXPLANATION
and RESULT support (C). Section 2.2 introduces
an apparent counterexample to this claim but then
shows that this example can easily be explained
within the confines of (C). In section 2.3, we show
that EXPLANATION* and RESULT* pattern with
their semantic counterparts with regard to paren-
thetical reports, and section 2.4 rounds out the dis-
cussion of contingency connectives by showing
that CONDITION and GOAL support (C) as well.
2.1 Semantic explanations and results
EXPLANATION is lexically marked by the con-
junctions because, since, after, when, now that, as
and for; there are no adverbials that lexicalize this
relation. Since, like because, supports (C).
(7) a. Fred can’t come to my party since he’s
out of town.
b. (#) Fred can’t come to my party since Jane
said he’s out of town.
The remaining causal conjunctions follow suit, but
due to particularities that arise from their temporal
nature, we delay our discussion of them until §4.
RESULT is lexicalized only by adverbial con-
nectives: therefore, hence, consequently, as a re-
sult, so, . . . . and these connectives appear to pat-
tern with markers of EXPLANATION with regard
to (C). In other words, if the matrix clause falls in
the syntactic scope of the adverbial, it falls in the
discourse scope of the adverbial as well.
Demonstrating that (C) holds for RESULT ad-
verbials requires care, because adverbials, unlike
conjunctions, can move around. Consider (8):
(8) Fred didn’t go to the party. (H,)1 Jane said
(,H,)2 that Luc (, H,)3 did (, H)4.
However could be inserted in one of any of the
four locations marked with ‘H’ above to make the
example felicitous. Yet to test whether however
allows parenthetical readings of reports in its syn-
tactic scope, only position 2 matters. Even when
however is in position 1, syntactic scope over the
matrix clause is not ensured, as the placement of
the adverbial could be the result of extraction from
the embedded clause (Kroch and Joshi, 1987; Pol-
lard and Sag, 1994).
Once we restrict our attention to adverbials in
position 2, we can see more clearly that some al-
low parenthetical readings of reports in their syn-
tactic scope while others do not. A parenthetical
reading of the report in (8) is permitted with how-
ever in position 2. By contrast, the placement of
afterwards in the matrix clause of (9) blocks a par-
enthetical reading.
(9) Fred went to Dax for Christmas. Jane said
afterwards that he went to Pau.
To the extent that (9) is felicitous, the second sen-
tence cannot be rephrased as Jane said that he
went to Pau afterwards (although this would be a
possible rephrasing of the example if afterwards
were in position 1, 3 or 4). The more natural read-
ing is a non-parenthetical one according to which
the time at which Jane made her statement was af-
ter the time at which Fred went to Dax.
Thus we can distinguish two groups of adver-
bials: (i) adverbs that when they have syntactic
scope over the matrix clause of a report do not
allow parenthetical readings of that report, e.g. af-
terwards, and (ii) adverbs that, given the same syn-
tactic configuration, do allow a parenthetical read-
ing of the report, e.g. however. We can then extend
these groups to discourse connectives in general,
including conjunctions. In these terms, because
falls in group (i), because it conforms to (C), and
although, in group (ii).
With the foregoing discussion of adverbials in
mind, we return now to RESULT and the question
of whether RESULT adverbials fall in group (i) or
group (ii). Consider (10):
(10) a. Fred drank too much last night.
Therefore, he has a hangover today.
b. Fred drank too much last night, Jane
said/thinks, therefore, that he has a
hangover today.
A parenthetical reading of the report in (10b)
would be one in which the content of the matrix
clause does not contribute to the second argument
of RESULT. In the case of (2), we said that the act
of Jane’s saying that Fred is out of town in no way
explains Fred’s absence—only the content of what
she said matters. Yet a parallel analysis is not ob-
viously correct for (10b) (which is why we have
included the matrix clause of the report in Arg2
above). While if Jane is right, it is true that Fred’s
hangover is the result of his over zealous drinking,
it is also reasonable to say that Jane’s conclusions
are the result of Fred’s drinking too much: it was
his drinking that prompted her to say or think what
she does. We conclude that therefore falls in group
(i) and, more generally, that RESULT supports (C).
2.2 A clarification
Before moving on to pragmatic causal relations,
let’s take a closer look at examples of EXPLANA-
TION in which the source of an indirect speech re-
port in the scope of because is also the agent of
the eventuality described in Arg1. At first glance,
such cases might appear to be counterexamples to
(C), because the report in the syntactic scope of
because does not provide a literal explanation of
the eventuality described in Arg1.
(11) Jane didn’t hire Bill because she said he
didn’t give a good interview.
It is presumably not the case that Jane did not hire
Bill because she said he didn’t interview well, but
rather because she thought that he didn’t do well.
Yet in (11), the author is not even weakly com-
mitted to the claim that Bill’s interview perfor-
mance is responsible for his not being hired, so the
report cannot have a parenthetical interpretation
(thus we have placed the matrix clause in bold-
face above). And if the report is non-parenthetical,
then (11) is not problematic; because readily al-
lows non-parenthetical readings of reports in its
syntactic scope, as illustrated in (12a) and (12b).
(12) a. Jane didn’t hire Bill because she thought
he didn’t give a good interview.
b. Jane didn’t hire Bill because her secre-
tary said/thought that Bill didn’t give a
good interview.
The only feature that sets (11) off from the mun-
dane examples in (12) is the fact that Jane’s act
of saying what she did does not provide a literal
explanation for her hiring decision. We think that
the use of an indirect speech report is permitted de-
spite this fact only because Jane is both the agent
of Arg1 and the source of the report in Arg2. The
assumed close tie between an agent’s thoughts and
actions, together with the semantics of because,
allow us to conclude in (11) that Jane thought Bill
didn’t do well—the real explanation proffered for
her hiring decision.
Interestingly, despite the non-parenthetical
reading of the report in (11), this example can be
reformulated with a syntactic parenthetical:
(13) Jane didn’t hire Bill because, she said, he
didn’t give a good interview.
This is interesting because normally a syntactic
parenthetical construction would be taken to en-
tail a semantically parenthetical construction. Yet
we do not think that the speaker is required to ac-
cept the content of Jane’s report in (13) any more
than she is in (11). The use of the syntactic par-
enthetical appears rather to distance the speaker’s
point of view from Jane’s. But as we argued for
the phenomenon illustrated in (11), we think that
the non-parenthetical interpretation of the syntac-
tically parenthetical report in (13) is made possible
only by the fact that the agent of Arg1 is the source
of the report in Arg2 of EXPLANATION.
2.3 Pragmatic explanations and results
Pragmatic result, or RESULT* in SDRT, holds be-
tween two clauses α and β when α provides justi-
fication for the author’s affirmation of β. In other
words, RESULT*(Arg1, Arg2) if and only if RE-
SULT(Arg1, affirm(author, Arg2)). In examples
(14a-c), Arg1 does not provide an explanation of
the conclusion drawn in Arg2 (the accumulation
of newspapers did not cause the neighbors to be
out of town), but rather of why the speaker or Jane
formed the belief that the conclusion holds. (14b)
and (14c) are examples of RESULT because they
make this causal relation explicit with I think or
Jane said/thinks. (14a), an example of RESULT*,
leaves this connection implicit. (In order to visu-
ally signal the presence of a pragmatic relation in
the examples in this section, we mark the corre-
sponding connectives with a ‘*’.)
(14) a. The newspapers are piling up on the
neighbors’ stoop. Therefore∗, they must
be out of town.
b. The newspapers are piling up on the
neighbors’ stoop. I think, therefore, that
they must be out of town.
c. The newspapers are piling up on the
neighbors’ stoop. Jane said/thinks,
therefore, that they must be out of town.
Reports in examples like (14b) and (14c) cannot
be read parenthetically, and the nature of RESULT*
prevents its second argument from ever being a
clause embedded by a parenthetically used verb.
EXPLANATION* reverses the order of explana-
tion from RESULT*, i.e. EXPLANATION*(Arg1,
Arg2) = EXPLANATION(affirm(author, Arg1),
Arg2). EXPLANATION* is marked by connec-
tives such as since, because, and for, which need
not be explicit, hence the parentheses in (15).
(15a) and (15c) are examples of EXPLANATION*,
while (15b) and (15d), which explicitly evoke the
speaker’s belief state for Arg1, are examples of
EXPLANATION.2
(15) a. The neighbors must be out of town
(because∗) newspapers are piling up on
their stoop.
b. I think that the neighbors must be out of
town because newspapers are piling up
on their stoop.
c. The neighbors must be out of town
(because∗) Jane said that newspapers
are piling up on their stoop.
d. I think that the neighbors must be out of
town because Jane said that newspapers
are piling up on their stoop.
In both (15c) and (15d), the matrix clause Jane
said contributes to Arg2, i.e. the reports are not
parenthetical. These examples are not like (2) be-
cause the fact that the evidence comes from Jane
is crucial in the formation of the speaker’s belief
that the neighbors are out of town in (15c,d) in a
way that it is not crucial to Fred’s absence in (2).
In all three examples, there is a reasoning process
involved in which Jane figures, but the reasoning
process is not the main point of (2) in the way that
it is for (15c) and (15d).
In §3 we will provide a further reason why (15c)
should not be considered parenthetical. This ar-
gument, together with those given in this section,
in turn supports our claim that connectives that
mark causal relations are members of group (i) of
discourse connectives, regardless of whether they
2We assume that for Jane to sincerely say that P, Jane must
believe P; it might be more accurate to talk about Jane’s com-
mitments rather than her beliefs, but that detail is not impor-
tant here.
mark semantic or pragmatic relations. That is,
these connectives conform to (C).
2.4 Other contingency relations
A quick review of the remaining contingency rela-
tions shows that principle (C) is obeyed through-
out this class. GOAL can be lexically marked by
the subordinating conjunctions in order that and
so that; semantic conditional relations are gener-
ally marked by the conjunction if. In all cases,
principle (C) is respected because the reports in
examples like (16b) and (17b) cannot be under-
stood parenthetically.
(16) a. Fred made a pizza last night so thatMary
would be happy.
b. * Fred made a pizza last night so that Jane
said/thinks that Mary would be happy.
(17) a. Fred will play tennis if Mary doesn’t
show up.
b. (#) Fred will play tennis if Jane
said/thinks that Mary won’t show
up.
3 Commitment and veridicality
Now that we have shown that contingency rela-
tions support (C), we return to the contrast be-
tween (2) and (3) and discuss the problems that
this contrast raises for existing theories of dis-
course and annotation.
In (15c) note that while the verb say could be re-
placed by, for example, noticed or told me, it can-
not be replaced by believe or thinks.
(18) # The neighbors must be out of town because
Jane thinks that newspapers are piling up on
their stoop.
(18) can be repaired, however, by weakening the
modal in Arg1 from must to might:
(19) The neighbors might be out of town
(because) Jane thinks that newspapers are
piling up on their stoop.
This follows from the semantics of EXPLANA-
TION*, which holds when Arg2 is presented as the
reason for drawing the conclusion given in Arg1.
The speaker is not entitled to draw a stronger con-
clusion than her evidence allows. The use of thinks
in (18) implies that Jane is not fully committed
to the claim that newspapers are piling up on the
neighbor’s doorstep, so the speaker is only entitled
to affirm a possibility claim like that in Arg1 of
(19). Thus (18) is infelicitous for the same reason
that (20) is not an example of EXPLANATION*:
Jane’s saying what she did does not justify the con-
clusion that the neighbors are out of town (Danlos
and Rambow, 2011).
(20) The neighbors must be out of town. Jane said
that newspapers are piling up on their stoop,
but that’s not why I think they’re gone.
In contrast to (18), (2) is felicitous with thinks:
(21) Fred didn’t come to my party. Jane thinks
he’s out of town.
In (21), the author’s commitment to Fred’s ab-
sence is allowed to be higher than Jane’s com-
mitment to his being out of town. This is be-
cause Jane’s saying what she did is not presented
as the justification of the author’s belief that Fred
wasn’t at the party. The author has other reasons
for thinking and saying that Fred was not at his
party; now he’s exploring reasons for Fred’s ab-
sence. Thus the contrast between (18) and (21)
provides further support for our claim in §2.3 that
the report in (15c) is not parenthetical; the seman-
tics of the report in (15c) affect the acceptability
of the example.
The foregoing discussion of parenthetical re-
ports has implications for the veridicality of dis-
course relations. In SDRT, which provides a the-
ory not only of discourse structure but also of the
interpretation of that structure, EXPLANATION and
RESULT, along with their pragmatic counterparts,
are veridical relations, where a relation R is veridi-
cal just in case if R(α, β) is true at a world w,
then α and β are true at w as well. In the case
of causal relations, for it to be true that one even-
tuality caused another, it must be the case that both
eventualities truly occurred. In this paper, we have
limited our study of parenthetical reports to the
right argument (Arg2) of discourse relations. Ac-
cordingly, we will limit our discussion of veridi-
cality to right-veridicality.
From the data that we have so far, it is clear that
EXPLANATION* is right veridical: if Arg2 isn’t
true, it cannot justify Arg1. Even in the case of
(15c), while what Jane said can be false, it must
be true that Jane said what she said. Likewise,
the data that we have discussed for RESULT, RE-
SULT*, GOAL and conditional relations indicate
that these relations are also right-veridical.
The question is more complicated for EXPLA-
NATION. A speaker who asserts (2) or (21) and
offers Jane’s comment as an explanation is not
fully committed to Fred’s being out of town. This
is clear in (21), where the verb think indicates a
hedged commitment. Thus, if we analyze the re-
ports in (2) and (21) as parentheticals, then right
veridicality is not ensured for EXPLANATION, at
least when unmarked by an explicit connective.
When EXPLANATION is explicitly marked with
because, since, or for, right veridicality appears
to be ensured by the fact that these conjunctions
block parenthetical readings of reports in their
syntactic scope. Yet (3), repeated as (22a), is
greatly improved if we use a syntactic parentheti-
cal, which suggests that its infelicity has more to
do with syntax than with veridicality:
(22) a. (#) Fred didn’t come to my party because
Jane said he is out of town.
b. Fred didn’t come to my party because,
Jane said, he is out of town.
However, note that said in (22b) cannot be re-
placed with a weaker embedding verb like thinks:
(23) # Fred didn’t come to my party because, Jane
thinks, he is out of town.
This shows that even though a syntactic parenthet-
ical is used in (22b), the speaker must be fully
committed to the content of Arg2, i.e. right veridi-
cality is ensured for EXPLANATION when it is ex-
plicitly marked with because.
We have seen that EXPLANATION is right
veridical when explicitly marked, but that (2) does
not require the veridicality of the clause labeled
‘β’. This difference forces us to make a choice.
We can maintain the claim that (2) is neverthe-
less an example of EXPLANATION; in this case,
we must adjust the semantics of EXPLANATION
accordingly and conclude that veridicality is a re-
quirement imposed by connectives, not relations.
Alternatively, we can maintain that EXPLANATION
is always (right) veridical; in this case, we must
give up the claim that (2) is an example of EX-
PLANATION.
We suspect that the second choice is better.
There is, after all, no connective that can be in-
serted between the sentences in (2) in such a way
that the meaning is preserved, which suggests that
a deep semantic difference is at play between (2)
and examples of EXPLANATION. Either way, how-
ever, existing theories of discourse structure will
need to be adjusted to account for our observations
on contingency relations and parenthetical reports.
For example, if (2) is not a genuine example of
EXPLANATION, SDRT needs to offer a viable al-
ternative relation. On the other hand, if (2) is a
genuine example of EXPLANATION, SDRT needs
to adjust the notion of veridicality in the semantics
of this relation and indeed, of any other suppos-
edly veridical discourse relations that allow their
Arg2 to be the embedded clause of a parenthetical
report.
Our observations also raise questions about the
semantic implications of the choice made in the
PDTB to insert an implicit connective in the ab-
sence of an explicit one. While this choice was a
practical one meant to facilitate the annotation task
for the PDTB, it has been taken to further levels in
other work on NLP, and we think this is danger-
ous from a semantic point of view. While NLP
systems designed to identify discourse relations in
the presence of explicit connectors have yielded
very positive results (f-scores over 90% for guess-
ing one of the four major PDTB sense classes, i.e.
Temporal, Contingency, Comparison and Expan-
sion (Pitler and Nenkova, 2009)), the task of iden-
tifying discourse relations that hold between spans
of text has proven very difficult in the absence
of explicit connectives. To handle the latter type
of case, systems have been designed that use the
deletion of explicit connectives, whose semantics
are known, to obtain examples with implicit con-
nectives that inherit the semantics of their explicit
counterparts in an effort to create new data that
can be exploited in the identification of implicit
relations (Marcu and Echihabi, 2002). In the other
direction, systems have been built to predict im-
plicit discourse connectives between two textual
units with the use of a language model (Zhou et
al., 2010).
In both kinds of systems, deleting an explicit
connective or adding an implicit connective is con-
sidered a harmless move, though this practice has
been questioned by (Sporleder and Lascarides,
2008). The data presented in this paper show that
the presence or absence of a discourse connective
may drastically change the data when reports of
saying or attitudes occur in the second argument
of a discourse relation — positing an implicit be-
cause in (2) is not an anodyne move from a seman-
tic point of view.
4 Temporal relations
While afterwards falls in group (i) of discourse
connectives, because it does not allow parentheti-
cal readings of reports in its scope, as shown in (9),
other temporal markers appear to fall in group (ii).
Consider, for example, after and before in (24a)
and (24b), respectively.
(24) a. Fred arrived at the sceneα after [police
say]β [the crime occurred.]γ
b. Fred had tried to improve his lifeα before
[police say]β [he robbed a bank.]γ
Both (24a) and (24b) have a reading according to
which the temporal relation indicated by the un-
derlined conjunction holds between the clauses α
and γ rather than α and β, which suggests that the
reports are parenthetical. The fact that the relation
between α and β can be independent of the tem-
poral constraints of the connective is clearest in
(24a) in which the time of β can actually be after
the time of α.
The possibility that temporal connectives allow
parenthetical readings of reports in their scope is
potentially problematic for our arguments in §2
because some temporal connectives, such as after,
now that, as and when, can have a causal sense in
addition to their temporal sense. And when they
do, parenthetical reports still appear to be possi-
ble, as shown in (25):
(25) Fred was arrestedα after [police say]β [he
pulled a gun on an officer.]γ
In (25), we understand the arrest as a result of
Fred’s pulling a gun on an officer, so after has a
causal sense. Nevertheless, the time of β can come
after the time of α, thus suggesting a parenthetical
report.
Interestingly, the data on after and before in En-
glish are not supported cross-linguistically. Up
to example (24), all of the data that we have dis-
cussed are felicitous in French if and only if they
are felicitous in English,3 but this is not so for (24)
and (25), whose French counterparts are syntacti-
cally ill-formed.
(26) a. * Fred est arrive´ sur les lieux apre`s que la
police dit/dise que le crime a eu lieu.
b. * Fred a essaye´ d’ame´liorer sa vie avant
que la police dise qu’il a cambriole´ une
banque.
3Some of the data presented in this paper are discussed
for French in (Danlos, 2013).
c. * Fred a e´te´ arreˆte´ apre`s que la police
dit/dise qu’il a pointe´ un pistolet sur un
policier.
The parenthetical reading of the report in (25) is
greatly aided by the use of the present tense on
say, which excludes the possibility that the matrix
clause introduces an eventuality that held before
Fred was arrested. For whatever reason, the use of
the present and/or present subjunctive in similar
environments is not allowed in French, as shown
in (26). This difference could be taken two ways.
Perhaps after does violate (C) after all and the only
reason that parenthetical readings are blocked in
(26) is because French syntax does not allow this
reading to be brought out. On the other hand, it
could be that after does support (C), but that police
say in (25) is not functioning as a standard matrix
clause.
Evidence for the second option, which is con-
sistent with (C), comes from the fact that all of the
examples that we have found like (25) come from
newspapers and involve a matrix clause like po-
lice say (parents say, teachers say, ...) and can be
paraphrased using allegedly instead of police say:
(27) Fred was arrested after he allegedly pulled
a gun on an officer.
Parenthetical readings do not appear to be possible
for reports in which the matrix clause cannot be
paraphrased with allegedly, as shown in (28):
(28) (?) Fred revised his negative opinion of Paris
after Jane says/said he had a wonderful visit
there last summer.
If the result in (25) does not generalize to standard
reports like that in (28), it is unlikely that the inter-
pretation of the report in (25) should be explained
in terms of the causal nature of after; it is far more
likely to be due to an idiosyncracy of the matrix
clause police say.
In any case, a full discussion of examples like
(25) is not directly relevant to the discussion of
causality in this paper. For the temporal connec-
tives that can have a causal sense (after, now that,
when, as, and their French counterparts), it is the
case in both French and English that when they
have a causal + temporal sense, their interpretative
possibilities match those in which these connec-
tives have a purely temporal sense. This fact, com-
bined with the fact that these connectives rarely if
ever have a purely causal sense, tells us that their
temporal nature is more fundamental. So (25) is
not a direct challenge to the arguments that we
have made in this paper about causal relations and
parenthetical reports.
Let’s return to (C):
(C) if a contingency relation is marked by an ex-
plicit connective that has syntactic scope over
the matrix clause of a report, this report can-
not have a parenthetical interpretation.
We conclude that this generalization holds for all
contingency relations and markers with a purely
causal or otherwise contingent sense. We further-
more predict that if there are examples in which ei-
ther after, now that, when or as has a purely causal
interpretation, in none of these examples will we
find a parenthetical reading of a report in the con-
nective’s syntactic scope.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the interaction be-
tween contingency connectives and the interpreta-
tion of reports that fall in their syntactic scope. We
have shown that contrary to certain other types of
connectives, such as contrastive connectives like
although and however, contingency connectives
restrict the interpretations of reports in their scope
so that these reports must be interpreted non-
parenthetically. That is, contingency connectives
support (C).We argued that this result has immedi-
ate implications for theories of discourse structure
and annotation. In particular, SDRT must either
adjust the semantics of EXPLANATION to include
examples like (2), which are not right-veridical, or
introduce a new relation to handle (2). And the
assumption that one can move between implicit
and explicit connectors—an assumption made for
practical reasons in the PDTB but taken to further
extremes in other work on NLP described in §3—
is not semantically innocent.
Throughout this paper, we have used con-
structed examples to simplify the discussion.
However, data from the PDTB provide support for
our claims in the sense that it provides no coun-
terexamples to (C) with because or since. We
found only 6 results for a search of the PDTB with
the following criteria: explicit relation + (connec-
tor = because) + (Arg2 Source = Other). Our aim
was to find examples in which a report is in the
syntactic scope of because. Of the 6 examples
that we found, two involved continuations of di-
rect quotations and so did not have an explicit ma-
trix clause, while the 4 remaining examples were
of the sort discussed in §2.2, where the agent of
Arg1 is the source of the report in Arg2. Nor did
we find any counterexamples with an equivalent
search for since (0 results for an equivalent search
with explicit since).
A separate search of the PDTB revealed no vio-
lations of (C) for examples in which now that, as,
and when have purely causal interpretations. That
is, for all examples in the PDTB in which now that,
as, and when are explicit and have a causal sense,
and in which ‘Arg2 Source = Other’ holds, these
connectors have a temporal sense as well. (There
are no examples in the PDTB in which after has
a purely causal sense). While a thorough study of
temporal connectives is needed to fully understand
the behavior of these conjunctions, as explained in
§4, these data provide strong prima facie support
for the claims made in §4.
In future work we would like to extend our
study of contingency connectives, starting with
temporal connectives, to see how far (C) can be
generalized to other kinds of relations. We also
hope to back up our results for English and French
with more cross-linguistic research. In the mean-
time, data on contingency connectives in French
and English offer clear support for (C).
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